ShieldMarc

What DMARC policy enforcement actually requires

By ShieldMarcUpdated 10 min read

What changed: Added dated .gov.uk figures from ShieldMarc's tracker, split between parish councils and other bodies, and how many enforce at the top with sp=none beneath.

DMARC policy enforcement means publishing p=quarantine or p=reject, so receivers can act on mail that fails DMARC. Merely publishing a record at p=none isn't enough. This guide explains what RFC 9989 actually requires for enforcement and what it doesn't promise. It also shows how the tags map to your DNS and how to evidence enforcement in reports. A common mistake: treating p=reject as a guarantee that failing mail gets blocked.

Contents
  1. What DMARC policy enforcement actually requires
  2. What DMARC policy enforcement does not require
  3. How enforcement maps to DNS and email controls
  4. Meeting the requirement without breaking mail
  5. Evidencing enforcement in reports
  6. Where ShieldMarc fits
  7. Start today
  8. Frequently asked questions

What DMARC policy enforcement actually requires

DMARC policy enforcement means the policy is p=quarantine or p=reject, not p=none, for the Organizational Domain and every subdomain below it (RFC 9989 s3.2.9). So a record that leaves sp=none or np=none falls short. It's a common gap: on 17 October 2026, ShieldMarc's tracker found 351 .gov.uk domains enforcing at the top with sp=none beneath.

RFC 9989 section 4.7 defines three policy values: none (monitoring only), quarantine (send fakes to spam) and reject (refuse fakes). Only quarantine and reject ask a receiver to act on failing mail. That's what makes them enforcement, while none is just observation.

Enforcement also depends on getting an aligned pass, not simply an SPF or DKIM pass on its own. A pass only counts towards DMARC when the authenticated domain matches the From domain. Relaxed alignment, the default, accepts the same Organizational Domain. Strict alignment, set with adkim=s or aspf=s, demands an identical domain (RFC 9989 s3.2.10, s4.7, s5.3.5).

Publishing p=reject carries its own requirement on the sending side. RFC 9989 sections 7.4 and 8 say a domain publishing p=reject must not rely on SPF alone. It must also sign its mail with valid DKIM.

That's because mail relayed by a forwarding address or alias arrives from the forwarder's server, which the original sender's SPF record doesn't list. A valid DKIM signature generally survives the relay.

NCSC's anti-spoofing guidance frames p=none as a deliberate first phase. It's a chance to see who sends mail for your domain before enforcement begins, not a step to rush past. The UK government turned that arc into a mandate rather than a suggestion.

From 1 October 2016, the Cabinet Office's Government Digital Service made p=reject the default DMARC policy for every service.gov.uk email service. It's one of the earliest examples of enforcement being required, not just advised. HMRC's head of cyber security at the time, Ed Tucker, said DKIM, SPF and DMARC:

represent the cornerstone of technical controls that senders can implement today to rebuild trust and retake the email channel. Source: dmarc.org

The wider .gov.uk register is further behind, and parish councils make up most of the gap. On 17 October 2026, ShieldMarc's UK public sector DMARC tracker found 53.2% of the 7,908 domains it measured enforcing.

That splits into 49.0% of parish, town and community councils and 66.8% of all other bodies. Another 20.8% had no DMARC record at all.

What DMARC policy enforcement does not require

DMARC policy enforcement does not require, or guarantee, that a receiver actually blocks spoofed mail. RFC 9989 section 7.4 says receivers must not reject mail purely because a record carries p=reject, and section 5.4 says they should not. Without further analysis, they must treat it as quarantine. Enforcement is a request to receivers, not a guarantee of what happens next.

It does not cover lookalike domains either. Enforcement only applies to exact use of your own domain in the From address. So it does nothing against cousin domains, homograph domains or a display name that shows your organisation's name over a different address. Those need separate detection, not a stricter DMARC policy.

It no longer involves a percentage ramp. RFC 9989 removed the pct= tag entirely (Appendix A.6, C.5.2, s9.3). So there is no ramp to plan, and you should remove pct= from any record.

Receivers running the older rules still follow a pct= value below 100 left over from an old record. They apply the policy to only that share of failing mail. That's exactly why it should come out, not stay as a safety margin.

It does not tolerate two records either. Publishing two DMARC records at the same name doesn't make receivers merge them or apply the stricter one. Both are discarded as if neither existed, and receivers carry on up the DNS tree (RFC 9989 s4.10, s4.10.1). So the domain quietly falls back to a parent domain's record, if there is one, or to no DMARC processing at all.

And it is not a certification requirement. Cyber Essentials does not require DMARC, SPF or DKIM. So enforcement is not a box to tick for the scheme. See our Cyber Essentials and email security guide for what NCSC guidance actually asks of suppliers.

How enforcement maps to DNS and email controls

Enforcement maps onto one DNS record, and a handful of tags inside it. A domain's DMARC policy is a TXT record at _dmarc.example.com. The record only counts if v=DMARC1 comes first, matched exactly and case-sensitively. Get that wrong and the whole record is ignored (RFC 9989 s4.1, s4.5, s4.7).

_dmarc.example.com. IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"

Two further tags extend the policy to subdomains. sp= sets the policy receivers apply to existing subdomains and falls back to p= when it is absent. np= sets the policy for subdomains that do not exist at all. It falls back to sp=, then p=, when absent (RFC 9989 s4.7).

Finding the record has also changed. Discovery walks up the DNS tree in at most eight queries rather than consulting the Public Suffix List that the older RFC 7489 used. psd=n now marks the Organizational Domain directly (RFC 9989 s4.10, C.3, s4.10.2).

Alignment strictness is also a tag, not a default you must accept. adkim and aspf set DKIM and SPF alignment to relaxed or strict. Relaxed, the default, means the same Organizational Domain. Strict means an identical domain (RFC 9989 s4.7). Relaxed is what most domains with several sending subdomains need. It is worth confirming SPF alignment against our SPF explainer before tightening it.

One tag exists purely to soften the p=, sp= and np= policies during testing. t=y drops enforcement one level, so reject acts as quarantine and quarantine acts as none. It doesn't change p=none itself or switch off reporting (RFC 9989 s4.7). Receivers still running the older RFC 7489 rules ignore t= as an unknown tag. So at those receivers, p=reject with t=y still means reject.

Meeting the requirement without breaking mail

Meeting the requirement without breaking mail means working through a sequence, not making a single DNS edit.

  1. Check for duplicate records first. Two records at _dmarc mean neither is read. Receivers carry on up the DNS tree as if the domain had no record of its own (RFC 9989 s4.10, s4.10.1).
  2. Publish p=none with a working rua= address. A record with no valid p, or an invalid sp or np value, is read as p=none only if it has a valid rua. Otherwise it gets no DMARC processing at all (RFC 9989 s4.10.1). The same rule means a later typo in sp= or np= cancels even p=reject.
  3. Fix SPF and DKIM for every legitimate sending source before moving the policy up. The DKIM Checker's setup steps by provider cover the common platforms.
  4. Move p=none to p=quarantine, then to p=reject, once reports show every real source aligning. The full walk is in our p=none to p=reject guide. The choice between the two later steps is in its quarantine or reject section.
  5. For a domain that never sends mail, publish p=reject immediately, alongside SPF -all. If it receives no mail either, add the null MX set out in our parked domains guide. The reject policy keeps mail using the domain out of the inbox at receivers that honour DMARC.

Pro Tip: Before moving from quarantine to reject, filter your aggregate reports to failing rows only. Then confirm every remaining source is something you don't recognise, not a legitimate sender with a broken SPF include.

DMARC enforcement checklist
  • Confirm only one DMARC record exists at _dmarc for the domain
  • Fix SPF and DKIM alignment for every legitimate sending source
  • Publish p=none with a working rua= address and read the reports
  • Move to p=quarantine once every real source passes and aligns
  • Sign all outbound mail with DKIM before publishing p=reject
  • Remove any leftover pct= value below 100 rather than planning a ramp

Evidencing enforcement in reports

Evidence of DMARC enforcement comes from the aggregate reports a domain's policy asks for, not from the DNS record alone. RFC 9990 now specifies aggregate reports (rua=), and RFC 9991 specifies failure reports (ruf=). Both were published alongside RFC 9989 in May 2026. The new aggregate format supersedes the RFC 7489 Appendix C format that many older guides still describe.

The evidence is in the report itself. It shows the policy the receiver found published. For each sending IP address, it also shows the message count, the disposition applied and the DMARC-aligned DKIM and SPF results. That combination shows whether receivers are applying the policy to failing mail while legitimate mail passes.

Each report is worth reading field by field rather than skimming a summary. See How to read a DMARC RUA XML report, and try the free DMARC report viewer.

Reports have real limits as evidence. They only ever arrive from receivers that choose to send them, and only for days those receivers actually saw your mail. They name only the last server that handled the mail before delivery. A quiet run of reports is not proof that nothing failed. It may only mean a large receiver did not send one.

NCSC's guidance on monitoring and updating DNS records also treats the reports as repeated work. That means a few rounds of investigating, updating records and reviewing new reports, not a check to run once and file away.

Where ShieldMarc fits

ShieldMarc's part in enforcement is to monitor it and show the evidence. Enforcement itself happens inside the receiver's mail system, driven by your DNS record.

The free Domain Trust Check runs the same Security Grade scan as the dashboard, with no account needed. It's an outside-in check, and its 16 checks include p=reject, subdomain policy at reject and a check that no leftover pct sits below 100.

Paid monitoring adds continuous watching once enforcement is in place. The DMARC health monitor re-reads the record every 5 to 10 minutes. It emails only when the effective p= changes, which catches a silent regression to quarantine or none.

Report data is kept 365 days on every plan, Starter included. Professional (£70 a month, or £50 a month billed annually) covers 25 domains. MSP (£130 a month, or £100 a month billed annually) covers 100 domain slots.

Both paid plans add Dynamic SPF, refreshed hourly at minute 17 to keep SPF under the 10-lookup limit alignment depends on. It starts when you subscribe.

A domain sending from one or two well-known providers may not need a paid plan to reach enforcement. That's true if someone is happy to check its DNS occasionally. The free checkers cover the DNS side, and Starter keeps a year of report data on one domain. Full plan details and the 30-day trial are on the pricing page.

Our view: the DNS side of enforcement is the easy part. What actually takes time is confirming every legitimate sender is accounted for before you tighten the policy. That only shows up by reading reports, not by checking the record once.

Start today

Start by checking where your domain's policy already stands. Then close the gaps before you move it up. Our DMARC checker validates a domain's DMARC record against RFC 9989. You can see whether its policy sits at none, quarantine or reject before you change anything.

Before changing p=, run the free SPF checker and DKIM checker. They confirm the SPF record stays within 10 lookups and your senders' DKIM selectors publish keys. The aggregate reports are what show a source that is not yet aligned. Enforcement magnifies whatever is not authenticated, rather than creating a new problem. So this step matters more as the policy gets stricter.

Our 30-day trial, no card required, adds monitoring and reports while you move through the policy levels. Subscribe before it ends and you keep its remaining days. Whichever plan you use, put a recurring weekly slot in the calendar to read aggregate reports. Do it while you're at p=none or p=quarantine, before advancing to p=reject.

Frequently asked questions

Does p=reject guarantee that spoofed email is blocked?

No. RFC 9989 says receivers must not reject mail solely because a record carries p=reject. Without further analysis, they must treat that mail as if the policy were quarantine (s5.4, s7.4).

The RFC leaves final handling to each receiver's local policy. So whether failing mail is rejected is the receiver's own decision, not a promise. Enforcement also only covers exact use of your own domain in the From address, not lookalike domains or a spoofed display name.

Is a pct= ramp still needed now that RFC 9989 has removed the tag?

No. RFC 9989 removed the pct= tag entirely, so there is no percentage left to ramp. Receivers running the older rules still follow a pct= value below 100 left in an existing record. They apply the policy to only that share of failing mail, which is why it should be removed rather than kept.

t=y is the current way to soften a policy during testing. It drops enforcement one level, so reject acts as quarantine and quarantine acts as none, without touching p=none or reporting. Receivers still running the older RFC 7489 rules ignore t= as an unknown tag. So at those receivers, p=reject with t=y still means reject.

Does Cyber Essentials require DMARC enforcement?

No. Cyber Essentials does not require DMARC, SPF or DKIM. Our Cyber Essentials and email security guide sets out what NCSC guidance actually asks suppliers to do.

How long does it take to reach DMARC policy enforcement?

RFC 9989 sets no deadline, and it suggests a minimum only for some domains. It says a domain whose users might post to mailing lists should not publish p=reject. If such a domain still wants it, it should first spend at least a month at p=none, then as long again at p=quarantine. It should use aggregate reports to judge the impact on its users (s7.4).

NCSC's guidance frames p=none as a deliberate monitoring phase. Move on from it only once every legitimate sender has been identified and aligned.

The DNS side is one change. Publishing or editing the _dmarc TXT record takes effect as soon as it propagates. Aggregate reports typically arrive in 24 to 48 hours. The slow part is fixing alignment for every real sending source first, not the record change itself.

What happens to subdomains when the parent domain enforces DMARC?

sp= sets the policy receivers apply to existing subdomains, falling back to whatever p= is set to when sp= is absent. np= sets the policy for subdomains that do not exist at all, falling back to sp=, then p=, when absent.

A subdomain that publishes its own DMARC record follows that record's p= instead of the parent's policy (RFC 9989 s4.10.1). So one left at p=none falls short of enforcement. Check it with the same free DMARC checker used for the parent domain.

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